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NEW YORK STATUTE PROHIBITING SALE OF
COVERLESS BOOKS HELD
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
People of the State of New York v. Bunis
9 N.Y2d 1, 172 N.E.2d 273 (1961)
The defendant, a New York bookstore owner, was prosecuted for
knowingly selling magazines from which the cover had been removed. A
New York statute, enacted in 1956, made it a misdemeanor for any person
to sell such a book or magazine.' The information was dismissed by the
City Court of Buffalo, and an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of
Erie County which reversed the City Court. A permissive appeal was then
taken to the New York Court of Appeals which reversed the New York
Supreme Court and found that the statute was unreasonable and deprived
the bookstore owner of his property without due process of law.
The purpose of the statute, as stated by the New York Court of
Appeals,2 is to prevent the resale of periodicals which have been recalled
by the publisher. Upon recall by the publisher, the wholesalers return only
the covers of the magazines; therefore, they are in a position to resell the
body of the issue to second-hand bookdealers who then sell them to the
public. Such illicit sales are harmful both to publishers, who refund the
purchase price, and to retailers, whose customers buy from second-hand
dealers at reduced prices.
The New York Court of Appeals did not state whether this statute
violated the due process clause of the New York Constitution3 or the
United States Constitution. The standard of due process under state
constitutions often varies from the due process standard of the fourteenth
amendment.4 A statute may be held unconstitutional as a violation of state
due process even though it is constitutional under the standard imposed by
the fourteenth amendmentY The court of appeals relied upon decisions
applying the New York due process clause; it is safe to assume that the
court intended to apply the New York due process clause. 6
The position of the New York Court of Appeals is that this statute
1 N.Y. Consol. Laws § 436-d (McKinney 1949), "Any person who knowingly
sells, offers or exposes for sale, (except in bulk as waste paper) any newspaper, magazine,
periodical or other publication, except a rare book, manuscript or educational text,
from which the title, trade name, trade mark or other identification mark has been
removed or obliterated, is guilty of a misdemeanor."
2 People v. Bunis, 9 N.Y.2d 1, 172 N.E.2d 273 (1961).
3 N.Y. Const. Art 1, § 6.
4 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), typifies the prevailing federal test.
G See Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); Boomer v. Olsen, 143 Neb. 579,
10 N.W.2d 507 (1941); See also Paulsen, "The Persistence of Substantive Due Process
in the States," 3 Minn. L. Rev. 91 (1950); Comment, 53 Col. L. Rev. 827 (1953);
Comment, 18 Ohio St. L.J. 384 (1957).
6 People v. Bunis, supra note 2.
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is unconstitutional because it prohibits all sales of coverless books merely
to prevent those which are illicit.7 The court places great emphasis upon
the fact that the statute punishes behavior which is proper and unobjection-
able." The due process clause of the New York Constitution has been inter-
preted to require that a law be not unreasonable or arbitrary and that it
be reasonably related and applied to some actual and manifest evil.9
Can it be said that a statute which punishes proper behavior is necessarily
unreasonable or arbitrary? The court cites People v. Estreich'° as authority
for such a proposition. This case held a statute making it a misdemeanor
for a junk dealer to receive stolen goods was unconstitutional, because it
punished a dealer who had made a reasonable inquiry as to the merchan-
dise's title. The court failed to explain why such a regulation deprives a
person of his liberty without due process of law.
The main criticism of the New York court in both of these cases is
not the standard of due process used, but the manner in which it was applied.
The broad generalization relied upon by the court in the instant case'
is of little aid in understanding the particular objections that make the
statute unconstitutional. These cases, and especially the principal case,
would have been of greater value as precedent and as guides to the
legislature if the following issues had been dealt with: the harm caused by
the statute, the utility of the statute, whether the harm outweighed tha
utility, and whether there were any alternatives which might have ac-
complished the same purpose without causing as much harm.
By prohibiting the sale of coverless periodicals, the legislature restricts
the bookseller's right to engage in his occupation, a right which many have
urged should be as highly protected as those embodied in the first amend-
ment. 12 The impact in this case is substantial because the statute provides
no exception for a bookseller who, using reasonable diligence, attempts to
determine the wholesaler's right to sell the coverless magazines.
The statute certainly accomplishes its purpose. By prohibiting all
sales of coverless literature, it deprives the dishonest wholesaler of his
market thereby discouraging him from engaging in these activities. The
benefit to society is indirect. It is the publishers and retailers of new
periodicals who are being cheated by these illicit activities; therefore, the pre-
vention of these activities provides a direct benefit only for the retailers and
publishers. However, there may be a potential indirect benefit to be derived
by society, since the prevention of these activities might reduce the
7 Id. at 274.
8 Id. at 274.
9 Defiance Milk Products Co. v. DuMond, 309 N.Y. 537, 132 N.E.2d 829 (1956);
Noyles v. Erie & Wyoming Farmers Co., 281 N.Y. 187, 22 N.E.2d 334 (1939); P & A
Carting Co. v. New York, 7 Misc. 2d 815, 158 N.Y.S.2d 296 (1956).
10 People v. Estreich, 297 N.Y. 910, 79 N.E.2d 742 (1948).
11 People v. Bunis, supra note 2, at 274, ". . . it is unreasonable and beyond the
legitimate exercise of the police power for the Legislature to interdict all sales, per-
missible and illicit alike in order to prevent those which are illicit."
12 See Gellhorn, Individual Freedom and Governmental Restraints, 105 (1956).
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publisher's expenses, thereby enabling them to market their periodcals to
the public at a reduced price. The distinction between direct and indirect
effects is important because the New York courts appear to be more
favorable to statutes curtailing illicit practices which directly affect the
consuming public.13
Whether the harm to booksellers outweighs the utility to society
depends upon an important fact not mentioned in the opinion-the magnitude
of the illicit practice. If there were merely a few instances in which whole-
salers resold coverless periodicals after claiming credits from the pub-
lishers, it seems that utility derived from making this isolated act illegal
would not be sufficient to override the harm done to the second-hand
bookdealers. If, on the other hand, the illicit practices were so numerous that
publishers' expenses were doubled and the public was required to pay
twice as much for periodicals as they ordinarily would, the utility would
probably overbalance the harm caused to the bookdealers. Both these
propositions are no doubt exaggerated; the situation is in all likelihood
somewhere in between. This consideration, however, appears to be important,
and it should have been explored by the New York court.
Assuming that the court found in the preceding issue that the utility
was greater than the harm, it is necessary to consider alternative measures
of regulation, since a positive finding would certainly be relevant to a
consideration of reasonableness. What alternative measures would have
stopped the illicit practice without as great an infringement upon the book-
dealer's rights? A licensing statute providing for revocation in the event
a wholesaler or retailer knowingly handles coverless books for which a
credit has been given by the publisher would differ from the present statute
in two ways. First, the penalty is forfeiture of a license instead of a monetary
fine, and secondly, all coverless books would not be prohibited per se,
but only those which the dealer knew had been returned for credit. Such
a statute would doubtlessly afford few revocations because of the difficulty
of proving mens rea. Because of this, the deterrent effect upon the whole-
salers would be lost, and the statute would be open to criticism because it
would not accomplish its purpose.
The publishers might also relieve themselves from their unfortunate
predicament by changing their marketing methods. Certainly, if the books
and magazines in their entirety were required to be returned, rather than
merely the covers, the illicit sales would be stopped. Such an alternative
anticipates no legislation at all, but should be considered by the court. For
the court to determine that such a practice would involve less burden on
constitutionally protected interests than did the challenged statute would
require knowledge of the costs of such a marketing change. No doubt such
information was not before the court at the time it rendered its decision.
It is apparent from the foregoing that the court, in order to render
13 People v. American Wool Stock Corp., 286 N.Y. 77, 35 N.E.2d 905 (1941);
Meltzer v. Nurman, 190 Misc. 149, 71 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1947).
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a decision on due process grounds, must have many extra-judicial facts
at its disposal. It is likewise apparent that the highest court in the state has
no opportunity to acquire these facts when they are not supplied by counsel.
In such a situation, the court has three possible alternatives. First, they may
decide the case regardless of the lack of facts, thereby taking the chance
that the wrong decision will be made. Second, they may remand the case
to a lower court and require them to obtain the necessary information.
Third, they may simply defer to the judgment of the legislature. This
alternative would result in the forfeiture of their power of judicial review.
The second alternative appears the most desirable, and, although it is ex-
pensive and time-consuming, it does afford an opportunity for reasoned
judicial review.
